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Introduction
The dissertation concerns digital forensic. The expression digital forensic
(sometimes called digital forensic science) is the science that studies the
identification, storage, protection, retrieval, documentation, use, and every
other form of computer data processing in order to be evaluated in a le-
gal trial [Gup13] [Pol10] [Tak04]. Digital forensic is a branch of forensic
science. First of all, digital forensic represents the extension of theories,
principles and procedures that are typical and important elements of the
forensic science, computer science and new technologies. From this concep-
tual viewpoint, the logical consideration concerns the fact that the forensic
science studies the legal value of specific events in order to contrive possi-
ble sources of evidence. The branches of forensic science are: physiological
sciences, social sciences, forensic criminalistics and digital forensics. More-
over, digital forensic includes few categories relating to the investigation of
various types of devices, media or artefacts. These categories are:
• computer forensic: the aim is to explain the current state of a digital
artefact; such as a computer system, storage medium or electronic
document [YEM∗03];
• mobile device forensic: the aim is to recover digital evidence or data
from mobile device, such as image, log call, log sms and so on;
• network forensic: the aim is related to the monitoring and analysis of
network traffic (local, WAN/Internet, UMTS, etc.) to detect intrusion
more in general to find network evidence;
• forensic data analysis: the aim is examine structured data to discover
evidence usually related to financial crime;
• database forensic: the aim is related to databases and their metadata
[Oli09].
The origin and historical development of the discipline of study and re-
search of digital forensic are closely related to progress in information and
communication technology in the modern era. In parallel with the changes
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in society due to new technologies and, in particular, the advent of the
computer and electronic networks, there has been a change in the mode
of collection, management and analysis of evidence. Indeed, in addition to
the more traditional, natural and physical elements, the procedures have
included further evidence that although equally capable of identifying an
occurrence, they are inextricably related to a computer or a computer net-
work or electronic means. The birth of computer forensics can be traced
back to 1984, when the FBI and other American investigative agencies have
began to use software for the extraction and analysis of data on a personal
computer. At the beginning of the 80s, the CART(Computer Analysis and
Response Team) was created within the FBI, with the express purpose of
seeking the so-called digital evidence. This term is used to denote all the
information stored or transmitted in digital form that may have some proba-
tive value. While the term evidence, more precisely, constitutes the judicial
nature of digital data, the term forensic emphasizes the procedural nature
of matter, literally, ”to be presented to the Court”. Digital forensic have
a huge variety of applications. The most common applications are related
to crime or cybercrime. Cybercrime is a growing problem for government,
business and private [Arm12].
• Government: security of the country (terrorism, espionage, etc.) or
social problems (child pornography, child trafficking and so on).
• Business: purely economic problems, for example industrial espionage.
• Private: personal safety and possessions, for example phishing, iden-
tity theft.
Often many techniques, used in digital forensics, are not formally defined
and the relation between the technical procedure and the law is not fre-
quently taken into consideration. From this conceptual perspective, the
research work intends to define and optimize the procedures and method-
ologies of digital forensic in relation to Italian regulation, testing, analysing
and defining the best practice, if they are not defined, concerning common
software. The research questions are:
1. The problem of cybercrime is becoming increasingly significant for
governments, businesses and citizens.
• In relation to governments, cybercrime involves problems con-
cerning national security, such as terrorism and espionage, and
social questions, such as trafficking in children and child pornog-
raphy.
• In relation to businesses, cybercrime entails problems concerning
mainly economic issues, such as industrial espionage.
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• In relation to citizens, cybercrime involves problems concerning
personal security, such as identity thefts and fraud.
2. Many techniques, used within the digital forensic, are not formally
defined.
3. The relation between procedures and legislation are not always applied
and taken into consideration.
The thesis has the following structure:
1. Literature review
2. Criminal investigation steps on digital investigation
3. Live digital forensic
4. Conclusions.
The literature review chapter 1 analyses the evolution of the concept of
forensic science, digital forensic, computer crime, computer crime related to
economic problem and how the European Union intends to deal with these
problems.
The Criminal investigation steps on digital investigation2 concerns the de-
scription and analysis of models related to the correct way to conduct an
investigation. Moreover, this chapter emphasizes the lack of a contextuali-
sation in relation to the legal system in which the model could be applied.
From this conceptual perspective, a model for non-volatile memory is de-
fined and contextualised in relation to the Italian legal system.
The Live digital forensic 3 analyses how it is possible to trace evidence to the
RAM of personal computer. In particular, some applications on Windows
XP and Windows 7 operating systems, which represent the most used, are
compared. The last, chapter 4, analyses the conclusive aspects concerning
the research work. Moreover, it proposes some recommendations related to
the discussed case study and the literature it is based on.
In conclusion, the aim of this thesis is to analyse some problems that cy-
bercrime entails for police during investigations. Among these problems,the
research work studied the analysis of both volatile and non-volatile memory.
Moreover, not only is the analysis from the computer science viewpoint, but
also from the legal system perspective, respecting the Italian legislation.
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Literature review 1
Chapter 1
Literature review
The frequency of cyber attacks is constantly increasing and cybercrime rep-
resents the principal cause of the these attacks. The term cybercrime con-
cerns crimes that are committed through the Internet, including different
types of crimes, such as, child pornography, the development and diffusion
of virus, identity theft and industrial espionage. Indeed, according to Inter-
pol, cyebercrime represents one of the areas that show a grater growth at
international level, becoming one of the principal prerogative of organised
crime.
From this conceptual viewpoint, this chapter aims to define the research
context. The chapter is structured in four sections. In the first 1.1, the
evolution of forensic science concept is analysed. In the second paragraph
1.2 the concept of digital forensic is defined with its major applications and
in relation to cybercrime. The third 1.3 highlights the economic problems
of cybercrime. The last paragraph 1.4 concerns the European Union’s influ-
ences in relation to this important question,cybercrime and how to contrast
that.
1.1 The evolution of concept of forensic sci-
ence
Forensic science derives from diverse disciplines, such as geology, physics,
chemistry, biology, and mathematics, in order to study physical evidence
related to crime. If it is suspected that a person has died from poison-
ing, for example, a toxicologist, who specializes in identifying poisons and
their physiological effects on humans and animals, can assist the forensic
expert in the investigation. Experts in other areas, such as botany, forensic
pathology, entomology, and archaeology, may also provide helpful informa-
tion to criminal investigators. Overall forensic science is a scientific method
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2 Literature review
of gathering and examining evidence [BPW06]. Moreover, criminal case is
solved with the use of pathological examinations that gather fingerprints,
palm prints, footprints, tooth bite prints, blood, hair and fiber samples.
In addition, samples of handwriting and typewriting are studied, including
all ink, paper, and typography. Ballistics techniques are used to identify
weapons as well as voice identification techniques are used to identify crim-
inals [JJN05].
The first official application of specific scientific branch in the solution of
a crime was represented by the use of medical knowledge. In the 1248, in
the Chinese book Hsi DuanYu or the Washing Away of Wrongs, ways to
distinguish between death by drowning or death by strangulation were de-
scribed [Ben01]. On the other hand, an Italian doctor, Fortunatus Fidelis is
considered as the first person to practice modern forensic medicine, begin-
ning in 1598. From this perspective, forensic medicine is the ”application
of medical knowledge to legal questions.” It became a recognized branch
of medicine in the early 19th century, when it was observed that contact
between someone’s hands and a surface left barely visible marks called fin-
gerprints [JJN05]. As a result, fine powder (dusting) was used to make the
marks more visible.
On the other hand, modern fingerprint identification dated at 1880, when
the British scientific journal, named Nature, published letters by the En-
glishmen Henry Faulds and William James Herschel described the unique-
ness and permanence of fingerprints [Ben01]. Their hypothesis were verified
by the English scientist Sir Francis Galton, who developed the first elemen-
tary system for classifying fingerprints based on grouping the patterns into
arches, loops, and whorls. Galtons´ system was improved by London police
commissioner, Sir Edward R. Henry. The Galton-Henry system of finger-
print classification was published in June 1900, and officially introduced
at Scotland Yard in 1901 [Ben01]. It is the most widely used method of
fingerprinting.
1.2 Digital forensics and computer crime
Digital forensics or digital forensic science concerns evidences from any dig-
ital device. First of all, it is extremely important to highlight the difference
between digital forensic and computer security. The first starts after the
fact happened. Indeed, it is the science of locating, extracting and analysing
types of data from different devices, which are interpreted by specialists in
order to be used as legal evidences. At the contrary, the second follows the
common saying ”prevention is better than a cure”. This concept concerns
all the processes and mechanisms by which computer-based equipment, in-
formation and services are protected from unintended or unauthorized ac-
cesses, changes or destructions. This science could be split in many branches
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Literature review 3
in relation to the analysed device. It is extremely important to know and
to understand this difference because the scenario is extremely wide and
the research focuses on only one of the above-mentioned branches. In-
deed, for example, digital forensic branches are: computer forensics, forensic
data analysis, database forensics, mobile device forensics, network forensics,
forensic video and forensic audio [Cas11]. From this conceptual perspective,
after this clarification, it is important to highlight that all discovered evi-
dences should be convincing and sufficiently reliable to stand up in court.
Sivaprasad and Jangale [SJ12a], in our definition, support these theses. In-
deed, they define digital forensics as the science of locating; extracting and
analysing types of data from different devices, which are interpreted by
specialists in order to be used as legal evidence [SJ12b] [SJ12a]. The digi-
tal evidence can be found in computer (hard disks, RAMs or graphics cards´
RAM), mobile phones, iPods, pen drives, digital cameras, CDs, DVDs, flop-
pies, computer networks, the Internet etc. [Vac05] or it can be hidden in
pictures (Steganography), deleted files, formatted hard disks, deleted emails,
encrypted files, chat transcripts, password protected files and so on. In a
nutshell, the digital evidence is information, stored or transmitted in binary
form, which has to be reliable in court. It can relate to source code theft,
on-line banking frauds, on-line share trading fraud, credit card fraud, tax
evasion, virus attacks, cyber sabotage, phishing attacks, email hijacking,
denial of service, hacking, murder cases, organized crime, terrorist opera-
tions, defamation, pornography, extortion, smuggling and so on [Ben01].
As a consequence, the digital forensics focuses on finding digital evidences
after a breach of computer security has occurred. It consists in the analysis
of information that are contained and created with computer systems and
computing devices, typically in the interest of figuring out what happens,
when it happens, how it happens and who is involved. Digital forensics is
the process of investigating a computer system to determine the cause of
the incident. A calculator, or more in general a capable digital device for
digital investigations, could have three distinct roles within the computer
crime:
• A computer can be the aim of the crime.
• It can be the means by which you commit the crime.
• It can serve as evidence repository storing of information that contain
criminal acts.
Computer forensics is a process to recognize, protect, extract and archive
electronic evidences that exist on the computer and on the related peripher-
als. Moreover, these evidences have to be sufficiently reliable and persuasive
in order to be accepted by the court. As a consequence, judicial forensics
must be subjected to the main body of the law, and must be executed in
accordance with the manner required by law and procedures [XCY11].
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Whichever organization, businesses or government, is actually making
an effort to contrast cybercrime, which is whichever crime that involves
any computer, tablet, smartphone or digital device and network [Moo06].
Indeed, the Internet is one of the main means to attack an organization.
Initially they are increasing their reliance on cyber technologies, such as
cloud computing, on-line banking and social networks. In tandem, the rate
of innovation in new technology is expanded and organisations are strug-
gling to keep up with the risks of introducing and using new technologies.
Cyber activities have entailed both a new type of economic crime and new
vectors to facilitate existing economic crimes [KC12].
Today, cybercrime relates to governments, businesses and private citizens
for different issues. First of all, governments has faced this issue because
it represents a social problem [ZMLJ11] (child trafficking, child pornogra-
phy1, terrorism [San11], etc.) and, at the same time, a security challenge
(espionage, terrorism, etc.). Secondly, in this specific field, business risks
concern business espionage and therefore financial problems. Finally cit-
izens risk theft identity, frauds and so on. In addition, Symantec (2010)
argues that during the 2008-2010 reference periods, the threat landscape,
once dominated by worms and viruses created by irresponsible hackers, is
now ruled by a new type of criminals. The cybercrime is typically a scam,
perpetrated by bogus emails, sent by ”phishers”, which are designed to steal
confidential information. Moreover, in the black market, different tools are
used for attacks, such as the so-called crime ware programs: bots, trojan
horses, and spyware [Mer10].
In this scenario, computer security and digital forensics are the correct so-
lution in order to prevent and to search evidence in relation to: data theft,
industrial espionage, unauthorized access to computer systems company,
damage information and to answer any potential litigation [PL12]. All gov-
ernments and businesses are increasingly being targeted by waves of attacks
from criminals and countries, looking for an economic or military benefit.
So numerous and advanced are the attacks that many organizations are
tackling problematic issues, such as the identification of the greatest risks
in terms of threats and vulnerabilities and the allocation of resources in
order to stop the most probable and damaging attacks in advanced.
In addition, although digital forensic is increasingly becoming important to
society and in the scientific debate, the regulations that govern this type
of crime are constantly evolving, representing a new field in the legislative
scenarios. Moreover, not only does the legislature often fail in dealing with
this kind of crimes, but these violations also involve several countries with
different legal systems. In this reference context, it is necessary to consider
the offences that every citizen commits. They go from tax evasion to online
banking fraud, terrorist operations, phishing or child pornography, juvenile
1Pornography is the sexual act performance of prepubescent age individuals.
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Figure 1.1: The cost mix of attacks by organizational size [Ins12].
pornography2 .
1.3 Economic problem related to computer
crime
Cyber-attacks are growing, as well as necessary economic costs to contrast
them [FAS12]. This is sustained by a study, commissioned by HP (Hewlett
Packard) and conducted by the Ponemon Institute on a sample of U.S.
companies. According to the survey titled ”2012 Cost of Cyber Crime
Study”, [Ins12], the frequency of attacks has more than doubled in three
years, while their economic impact has increased by almost 40 percent. In
2012, the average annual cost of cybercrime, which the interviewed compa-
nies paid for the research, was $ 8.9 million, increasing by 6 percent and 38
percent compared to the average cost of 2011 and 2010 respectively. The
2012 survey also showed a 42 percent growth in the number of crimes, iden-
tifying an average of 102 successful attacks against the company each week,
compared to 72 and 50 attacks in 2011 and in 2010 respectively. As showed
in 1.1, the most expensive cybercrimes are caused by ”malware”, Denial of
Service (DoS), theft or misappropriation of devices and damages provoked
by internal staff. The set generates more than 78 percent of the annual costs
related to computer crime suffered by businesses. In according to the survey,
information theft and disruption continue to represent the highest external
2Juvenile pornography is the sexual act performance of individuals who are not adult
but they have already undergone some physical and mental changes from a child to an
adult.
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costs. Indeed, on an annual basis, in 2012 information theft represented
44 percent of the total external costs, increasing by 4 percent compared
to 2011. Meanwhile, the business interruption, or loss of productivity to-
talled 30 percent of the external costs, increasing by 1 percent compared
to 2011. The average time that is necessary to definitely suppress a cyber
attack is 24 days. However, according to the study, the estimated time is
50 days. From these considerations, the average cost paid by companies
during 24-days period was $ 591.780, representing an increase of 42 percent
compared to the last year estimated average cost, or $ 415,748 in a 18 days
period. In support of this study, bank robbers steal approximately $100
million per year in the US [Les11]. Phishing alone resulted in $120 million
per quarter [XCY11]. A single botnet ring took $100 million before the FBI
managed to stop it [DB11].
Moreover, a survey was carried out by TNS Opinion & Social network in
the 27 Member States of the European Union between 10th and the 25th
of March 2012. Around 26 thousand respondents from different social and
demographic groups were interviewed face-to-face at home in their mother
tongue on behalf of Directorate General Home Affairs. Internet users were
questioned on the various activities that they do online. The vast majority
of internet users across the EU uses email (85 percent) and many respon-
dents say that they read news online (64 percent). In addition, around half
of internet users say that they buy goods or services (53 percent), they use
social networking sites (52 percent), or they do online banking (48 percent).
Around a quarter (27 percent) play games online, while 20 percent sells
goods or services. From this context, it is clear as the cybercrime is rele-
vant to modern society [Soc12].
Finally the evolution of computer security software and other defences on
client endpoints is driving threats into different areas of the operating system
(S.O.) stack, especially for covert and persistent attackers. The frequency of
threats attacking Microsoft Windows below the kernel are increasing. Some
of the critical assets targeted include the BIOS, master boot record (MBR),
volume boot record (VBR), GUID Partition Table (GPT), and NTLoader.
Although the volume of these threats is unlikely to approach those of simpler
attacks on Windows and applications, the impact of these complex attacks
can be far more devastating.
1.4 European Union’s influences
The extraordinary development of information technology leads to obvious
consequences for organized ”traditional” crime. The use of systems and
computer networks is an undeniable step forward for the company, but it
makes it more vulnerable. Terrorist groups, networks related to pornogra-
phy or paedophilia, trafficking in arms, drugs, human beings, money laun-
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dering and cyber criminals, exploit this vulnerability and the development
of these new media to increase their illegal activities. The Budapest Con-
vention [bud01], made by a committee of experts in approximately 4 years of
work, is in fact the first international agreement to frame the crimes related
to the Internet and computer network. In particular, one of the principal
aims is to extend the scope of computer crime to all crimes, committed in
any way, through a computer system, even in the case in which the proof
of the offense is in electronic form [bud01].
The Budapest Convention, signed in 2001 and divided into 4 chapters
[bud01], entered into force on July 1st 2004 in Italy, and it is the only
international binding treaty that exists today for this scope. The treaty
establishes guidelines for all states that wish to develop a comprehensive
national legislation against cybercrime. It shall be open for signature by
non-European states, providing the framework for international cooperation
in this field [bud01]. The treaty is supplemented by an additional protocol
concerning the criminalization of racist and xenophobic nature acts commit-
ted through information systems [bud01]. Although, establishing effective
rules in relation to a place where all people have access but it does not
belong to anyone, it is a very daunting task, it is necessary to have stan-
dards to maximize freedom reducing to a minimum the risks of navigation
on cyberspace.
In more detail, the convention aim is to harmonize the criminal offenses
related to computer crime. Moreover, it provides, to the signatory coun-
tries, the appropriate tools to investigation and prosecution of crimes related
to the computer and finally, to build an effective system of international
cooperation, which must be: a) provided the greatest extent possible, b)
extended to all offenses relating to systems and computerized data, c) con-
sistent with international agreements [bud01]. In view of the fact that the
technologies are evolving faster than legal solutions to solve problems, it is
necessary to constantly face new challenges. They are often related to data
protection issues, such as access and exchange of data beyond borders be-
tween the police forces and information sharing and between the public and
private sectors. In accordance with the Convention, member states must
make important changes to the offenses under the criminal code. These
modifications are related to: illegal and intentional access, without right,
to an information system entirely or partially; the illegal wiretapping that
are intentional and unlawful interceptions of computer data, carried out
through technical means, during non-public transmissions; the aggression
on the integrity of the data (damaging, deletion, deterioration, alteration
or suppression of computer data) done intentionally without authorization;
the attack to integrity of the systems that is translated into a serious im-
pediment to the functioning of an information system, carried out intention-
ally without right through the damaging, deleting deterioration, alteration,
suppression of computer data; intentional abuse without authorization of
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devices (that is the production, sale, procurement for use, the importation,
distribution and other forms of provision) including computer software, de-
signed to allow the commission of the crimes listed above, as well as keyword
(password) or access codes or similar systems that permit entire or partial
access to information system [bud01]. Although many of these issues, such
as computer fraud, unauthorized access to computer systems, child pornog-
raphy, the interception of telematics data, are largely covered by the Italian
law, important changes have been introduced in relation to administrative
responsibility of legal persons and to the privacy law. Indeed, stricter dis-
positions, concerning administrative responsibilities related to cybercrime,
are introduced. In addition, companies that do not implement measures to
prevent cyber crimes, committed by their staff, will face severe penalties for
patrimonial responsibility. Moreover, the Convention provides a power ex-
tension to police force to obtain the data from the operators. They may be
forced to conserve and protect the data relating to ITC traffic for 6 months
and they are required to the immediate release of the information and to
the maintenance of secrecy on orders under penalty of imprisonment up to
3 years. The achieved results and challenges were discussed at the annual
conference of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, held on 21
and 22 November in Strasbourg that was followed by a special meeting to
celebrate the 10th anniversary of the Convention, November 23, 2011.
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Chapter 2
Criminal investigation
steps on digital
investigation
This chapter describes a methodology that should be used when it is neces-
sary to analyse devices with non-volatile memory, with particular attention
to the phase ”Examination”, which is explained later on. In addition, a
whole series of specific tools [GL07], used in computer forensics under Linux
distribution, has been tested for each phase. Despite the existence of var-
ious tools and devices to investigate the evidence, the research intends to
use only open software with only a common personal computer. Although,
this methodology should be always followed, its use is fundamental in rela-
tion to the legal system, because working in this field entails implications
for computer experts when they make mistakes. This work was presented
at the Cybersec2013 [FS13b] and in an article on International Journal of
Cyber-Security and Digital Forensics (IJCSDF) [FS13a].
This chapter is composed of five parts. The Section 2.1 presents an overview
of current models. The Section 2.2 concerns an overview of the Italian legal
system into the computer forensics scope. The Section 2.3 illustrates the
proposed model in a detailed way and its contribution to the state of the art.
The Section 2.4 presents the novel model limitations and the last part 2.5
completes the chapter through the improvements and future works.
2.1 Overview
In 2001 Kruse and Heise [Per09] developed one of the first model in digital
forensic. The process showed in Figure 2.1 is essential. Indeed, it consists
Fabrizio Solinas Tecnical and legal perspectives on forensics scenario
i
i
“Tesi” — 2014/5/5 — 10:52 — page 10 — #18 i
i
i
i
i
i
10 Criminal investigation steps on digital investigation
Figure 2.1: Kruse & Heiser Model [Per09].
in only three steps. The first step is acquiring data. In this phase, data
are collecting and their integrity should be preserved. Then, there is the
authenticating evidence phase that involves making sure that it is as valid
as the original. Finally, analysing evidence steps is the process that analyse
the data, keeping its integrity.
Moreover, different models have been developed [Pol07a] [YYH11] [SPRT13].
Table 2.1 shows a complete list of digital forensic investigation models based
on chronological order.
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Table 2.1: List of complete digital forensic investigation model
Model Name Inventers Years Number
of
phases
Computer Forensic Investigative
Process [M.M95] [Pol07b]
M.Pollitt 1995 4 Phases
DFRWS Investigative Model
(Generic Investigation Pro-
cess) [Pal01]
Palmer 2001 6 Phases
Scientific Crime Scene Investigation
Model (SCSI) [Cia04]
Ciardhuain 2001 4 Phases
Abstract Model of the Digital Foren-
sic Procedures (ADFM) [MR02]
Reith ,Carr and
Gunsh
2002 9 Phases
Integrated Digital Investigation Pro-
cess (IDIP) [Car09]
Carrier and Spafford 2003 5 Phases
End To End Digital Investiga-
tion [Ste03]
Stephenson 2003 6 Phases
Enhance Integrated Digital Investi-
gation Process (EDIP) [Tus04]
Baryamureeba and
Tushabe
2004 5 Phases
Extended Model of Cyber Crime In-
vestigation [Cia04]
Ciardhuain 2004 13 Phases
A hierarchical, Objective Based
Framework for the Digital Investiga-
tions Process [Bee04]
Beebe and Clark 2004 6 Stages
Event Based Digital Forensic Inves-
tigation Framework [CS04]
Carrier and Spafford 2004 16 Phases
Forensic Process [KCGD06] Kent K, Chevalier,
Grance and Dang
2006 4 Phases
Framework for a Digital Forensic In-
vestigation [KOE06]
Kohn , Eloff and
Oliver
2006 3 Phases
Computer Forensic Field Triage Pro-
cess Model (CFFTPM) [RGM∗06]
K.Roger, Goldman,
Mislan, Wedge and
Debtota
2006 12 Phases
Investigation Process model [FS07] Freiling and Schwit-
tay
2007 4 Phases
Dual Data Analysis Process [BH07] Bem and Huebner 2007 4 Phases
Digital Forensic Model based on
Malaysian Investigation Process
(DFMMIP) [Per09]
Perumal S. 2009 7 Phases
Network Forensic Generic Process
model [PJN10]
Pilli, Joshi and
Niyogi
2010 9 Phases
Systematic Digital Forensic Investi-
gation Model [AA11]
Ankit Agarwal,
Megha Gupta,
Saurabh Gupta and
Prof (Dr.) S.C.
Gupta
2011 11 Phases
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12 Criminal investigation steps on digital investigation
2.2 The Italian legal system within computer
forensic scenario
Due its nature, the Internet cannot be within a single jurisdiction, so con-
sequently the computer forensics is closely related to this concept [Bro04]
[MD09]. For this reason, this section aims at providing an overview of how
the crimes are handled by the Italian legislation within the computer crime.
In recent years, the demand for analysis of digital data for the purpose
of investigation has been increased due to rise of felony related to digital
devices. The analysis could concern:
• Offences within information technology (L. 547/93);
• Offences that are not committed by means of computer systems;
• Offences whose traces or clues are found in computer systems;
• Preservation of digital data (memory, media, etc.).
Actually, in Italy it is extremely important the ratification of Budapest
Convention on cybercrimes. The Convention is currently the only binding
international treaty. The Treaty establishes guidelines for all states that
wish to develop a comprehensive national legislation against cybercrime.
This treaty could be endorsed by Europeans and non-Europeans countries,
providing as a result the framework for international cooperation in this
field. In addition, the Convention is supplemented by an additional pro-
tocol concerning the criminalization of racist and xenophobic nature acts,
committed through electronic systems. Italy, thanks to law 18 March 2008
no. 48 [rat08], has ratified the Council of Europe on Cybercrime, signed
in Budapest on 23 November 2001. This law, among the numerous innova-
tions, introduced the following articles after the number 254 of the code of
criminal procedure:
• Article no. 244, paragraph 2, second sentence, where the following
words are added at the end:”, in relation to information or computer
systems, using technical measures that aim at ensuring the preserva-
tion of the original data and prevent distortions.” [pro08];
• Article no. 247, after paragraph 1 it is inserted as follows: ”1-bis.
When there is a reason for believing that data, information, computer
programs or tracks, which are relevant to offense, are in a computer
system, it is necessary to adopt technical measures in order to ensure
the conservation of the original data and to prevent distortions. ”
[pro08];
• Article no. 248, paragraph 2, first sentence, the words ”records, docu-
ments and correspondence with banks” are replaced by the following:”
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Criminal investigation steps on digital investigation 13
banks records, documents and correspondence as well as data, infor-
mation and software” [pro08];
• Article no. 254 has entailed the following changes:
a) Paragraph 1 is replaced by the following: ”1. Who provides postal,
telegraphic, electronic or telecommunication service is allowed to pro-
ceed to the seizure of letters, fold, parcels, values, telegrams and other
items of correspondence, even if submitted electronically, and when
the court has reasonable grounds to believe that they are sent by the
accused or to him, even with different names or by someone else, or
someone who may be related to the offense ”; b) Paragraph 2, af-
ter the words ”without opening” shall be inserted the following: ”or
alter.” [pro08];
• Article no. 254-bis. - (Seizure of computer data by providers of ser-
vices, telematics and telecommunications). ”In case of seizure of data
concerning suppliers of telematics or telecommunications services, the
court may establish that their acquisition is carried out by copying
them on adequate support in relation to the regular supply of such
services. This process could be conducted by means of a procedure
to ensure the data immutability and their reliable acquisition to the
original ones. In this case, however, the service provider has the task
to preserve and protect adequately the original data.” [pro08];
• Article no. 256, paragraph 1, after the words: ”also in original if
it is so ordered” the following words are inserted: ”as well as data,
information and sofware, including by copying them on adequate de-
vice.” [pro08];
• Article no. 259, paragraph 2, after the first sentence the following
text is included: ”When the custody is related to data, information
or software, the custodian is also warned of the obligation to prevent
distortion or the access by third parties, except in the case that they
are authorized by the court.” [pro08];
• At the article no. 260 entails the following changes: a) Paragraph
1, after the words ”by other means” the following sentence is added:
”even of an electronic or computer nature”; b) Paragraph 2, the fol-
lowing sentence is added: ”When the case concerns data, information
or software, the copy has to be made on suitable supports, using the
procedures that ensure compliance of the copy to the original and its
immutability. In such cases, the custody of the originals can be placed
in different places by the registrar or by the secretary.” [pro08] From
this normative framework, the mentioned changes promote the use of
techniques that ensure the repeatability of the assets and in addition
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14 Criminal investigation steps on digital investigation
they require the tracking of operations that allows verification of all
completed actions.
From a fiscal and civil point of view, the main laws related to cybercrime
and digital device are:
• CAD (Italian code for Digital Administration) (Legislative Decree 5th
march 2005, no. 82): articles. 20-23 and articles 40-44;
• The DPCM (Prime minister decree1 ) 13 of January 2004 ”Technical
norms for creation, transmission, preservation, copy, reproduction e
validation, even temporal, of a digital document”;
• The Finance ministry decree 23 January 2004 (DMEF) ”Discharg-
ing methods of fiscal duties for the digital document reproduction on
various devices”;
• The CNIPA Resolution (Public administration national center for
information technology) Resolution. 11/2004 19th February 2004
”Technical norms for digital document preservation and reproduction
on an optical device in order to assure the perfect correspondence
between the digital document and the authentic document”.
The legislative decrees are also added as following:
• Legislative decree 20th February 2004 no. 52 (implementing the di-
rective 2001/115/CE, covering electronic invoicing);
• Legislative decree 196/2003 data protection act, in particular annex
B) quoted on CAD (Italian code for digital administration) article n.
44) and the DPR2 11th February 2005 no. 68 (in the field of PEC3 ).
Article 44 of CAD4 defines precisely that all the preservation methods
of digital documents have to guarantee:
• the precise identification of the document writer;
• the integrity/wholeness of a document;
• the readability and traceability of the documents and ID information,
including the registration and the filing of pristine data;
• the observation of all the security rules established by the articles from
no. 31 to no. 36 of the legislative decree, 30 June 2003, no. 196, the
technical specification in Annex B of this decree.
1Corresponding to statutory instrument.
2Decree by President of Italian Republic.
3Certified web mail.
4Italian code for digital administration
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Criminal investigation steps on digital investigation 15
Figure 2.2: Phases of Systematic Digital Forensic Investigation Model (SRD-
FIM) [AA11].
Finally, in Italy the term ”computer forensic expert” is used to identify
the professional who works in the field of computer crime. The computer
forensics expert have to take care to preserve, to identify, to study and to
analyse the contents that are stored in whatever media or storage device.
Not only does the task of experts focus on all categories of computers, but
it also concerns any electronic equipment with a potential for data storage,
such as mobile phones, smart-phones, home automation systems, motor ve-
hicles, and all devise that stores data. However, due to the heterogeneity
of unsearchable media, this professional is called ”digital forensic expert.”
In the Italian legal system, there is a difference between the possibility of
investigation requested by the prosecutor and defence investigations. In-
deed, for example, when the ”computer forensic expert” is nominated by
the prosecutor, he obtains the status of public official, and his statements
are true until proved otherwise. In conclusion in this paragraph the Italian
legislation in relation to this field is analysed in order to underline how it is
continuously evolving.
2.3 The novel model to satisfy the legal sys-
tem
In relation to the Table 2.1, first of all, the research analyses the last model
”Systematic Digital Forensic Investigation Model” that is showed in Figure
2.2 and it consists of eleven steps [AA11].
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16 Criminal investigation steps on digital investigation
Figure 2.3: Phases of Examination’s SRDFIM phase [FS13b].
The choice of this model depends on different issues. First of all, the
model allows being perfectly adapted to the modern cases. Indeed, this new
approach presents a certain degree of circularity that allows repeating some
steps. In addition, the concept ”Capturing the time-line according to the
country Digital Forensic Law” is rightly explained for the phases 4, 5, 6,
7, 8. The last concept is extremely important with respect to the differ-
ent legislations where this model is applicable. SDFIM categorizes evidence
collection of digital devices into two categories: volatile evidence collection
and Non-Volatile evidence collection. This categorization is done in ”ev-
idence collection” and this research focuses on Non-Volatile evidence into
the ”Examination” phase. Indeed, the research analyses in detail only the
eighth phase called ”Examination” related to the non-Volatile evidence. As
a result, the study aims at developing a new approach for the examination
of Non-Volatile evidence collection. First of all, it is useful to define what
Non-Volatile evidence is. They are all devices that are able to store perma-
nently data, for instance hard disk and external storage in general, such as
compact flash (CF) cards, memory stick, secure digital (SD) cards, MMC
cards, USB memory sticks [KGR06].
The development of the ”Examination” phase is led to create a list of steps
that are summarized in Figure 2.3.
In relation to the chart, the first step is to create the hash code of the de-
vice. In the second phase, the correct image copy is done. After the second
phase, the process is divided into two ramifications that can be executed
parallel to each other. The first, on the left, is composed of only one step
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Criminal investigation steps on digital investigation 17
”data recovery/data carving”. Meanwhile, the second, on the right, is char-
acterized by two phases: disk analysis and mount partition. Lastly, there
is ”files data analysis”. During tests of case studies where this approach
was tested, only a simple personal computer and some other devices, such
as box external, usb cable, SD card adapter was used. In addition, no
software was bought. Indeed, the preliminary phase was to study the dif-
ferent Linux distributions, which have been developed in relation to digital
investigation such as DEFT, CAINE, HELIX or BACKTRACK. Not only,
the choice of a specific Linux distribution is related to the fact that it is
free, but also it concerns several reasons. First of all, it is implemented the
first best practice into computer forensic of Non-Volatile memory, that is:
auto mount disabled. In addition, it is a flexible environment, where the
majority of additional tools are free and also open source. The last aspect
is extremely important, indeed it is possible to know what happens ”under
the hood” and if they are used in correct way. As a consequence, they
could be brought in the court. In conclusion, these Linux distributions, or
other, typical for computer forensics analysis, implement other important
peculiarities as following:
• At the boot, the system does not use swap partition of the system
that is subjected to the analysis;
• During the activity of analysis, there are not automatisms, by doing
so, the user is the owner of the device and he must be conscious of the
command that he is going to run;
• all mass memory acquisition tools do not modify the data originality.
Finally, in this research, there are not references to Sleuth Kit toolkit5
tools while Autopsy6, which is a graphical interface to the digital inves-
tigation tools in the Sleuth Kit. Moreover, for each phase it is specified
only a list of the possible tools and not a detailed description of how to use
them. Indeed, reading manual is the best solution to improve knowledge
with respect to a specific tool.
2.3.1 Creating hash code phase
The first step is ”creating hash code”. This phase concerns the creation
of hash7 code, usually MD5 or SHA, of drive. In relation of this step, it
5The Sleuth Kit is written by Brian Carrier and maintained at
http://www.sleuthkit.org/sleuthkit/index.php. It is partially based on The Coro-
ner’s Toolkit (TCT) originally written by Dan Farmer and Wietse Venema.
6http://www.sleuthkit.org/autopsy/index.php
7Hash codes are large numbers, specific to each file and each drive that are mathe-
matically computed. If a file or drive is changed, even in the smallest way, the hash code
will also change. These hash codes are re-computed on the original and on its images at
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18 Criminal investigation steps on digital investigation
is extremely important to know that in 2005, Xiaoyun Wang and Hongbo
Yu proved how breaking MD5 and Other Hash Functions [WY05]. In this
perspective, in this step it is necessary to calculate MD5 and SHA of device.
As a consequence, it is clear that after the second phase the image copy
is effectively a copy that could be brought to the court. In this step, it is
impossible to create the hash code for each file that is present into the device.
Indeed, there is not knowledge about files inside the drive. Moreover, within
Linux distribution, there are many tools to calculate hash code, for instance
md5sum and sha1sum.
2.3.2 Image copy phase
Before starting with this step, when the mass memory is connected to
the personal computer, it is useful to see the log message whose path is
/var/log/messages in Linux distribution. This operation is made through a
tool called tail. In this way, it can know the identification that the operating
system has got to the device. The aim is to create a reliable copy of the
device (bit stream image) that, as a consequence, could be brought to the
court. On the other hand, a bit-stream image is a sector-by-sector / bit-by-
bit copy of a hard drive. A bit-stream image is actually a set of files that
can be used to create an exact copy of a hard drive, preserving all latent
data in addition to files and directory structures. The majority of the tools,
used to analyse the hard drive, can read a bit-stream image. This mirror
is the only way to have got a reliable copy. Indeed, the simple copies of
data do not allow protecting the original data from inadvertent alterations.
Acquiring these kinds of exact copies requires the use of specialized forensics
techniques. This copy, usually in raw format, is a file image of the analysed
drive. It is possible to create more files image of the same device. Each
of them is a part of the whole image file. Moreover, it is good practice to
create one copy of backup and all the copies that are necessary to work well.
Indeed, it is important to not stress the device. Using the drive whenever,
the probabilities to break accidentally the evidence increase.
After the copy is made, it is possible to calculate the hash code of the im-
age file. Type of hash code must be the same in the previous step. For
instance, if in the previous step are used MD5 and SHA, at the same way
in this sub-step it is necessary to calculate the same. As a result, it is nec-
essary to check if these hash codes are different with respect to the original
hash. From this perspective, if the hash codes are different, it is mandatory
to create a new file image, deleting the previous one. This process has to be
reset until the hash code and the image file are identical. All this process
is synthesized in Figure 2.4.
various points during the investigation in order to ensure that the examination process
does not modify the examined image [RMB11].
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Figure 2.4: Flow chart of image copy phase.
One of the possible tools to create bit stream image is GNU dd command
shell. It is robust, well tested, and it has a proven track record. However,
several forensic specific tools exist, as following:
• dc3dd, based on dd code, is a patched version of it with added fea-
tures for computer forensics. The main feature is that on a partial
read, the whole block is wiped with zeros. This allows for repeatable
reads/hashes of a drive with errors.
• dcfldd, fork of dd code, enhances it for forensic use. It was developed
by the Department of Defense Computer Forensics Lab in U.S.A.
• ddrescue enhances dd program. It allows mass memory acquisition
that has reading errors, indeed it has intelligent error recovery.
• aimage, this tool is used to acquire Advanced Forensic Format (AFF)
images.
• ewfacquire, this tool is used to acquire Expert Witness Format (EWF)
images. It is one of tools that are included into libewf package that is
a library to access the EWF Format.
After this phase, all operations will be done only on image files, created
from the first image.
Fabrizio Solinas Tecnical and legal perspectives on forensics scenario
i
i
“Tesi” — 2014/5/5 — 10:52 — page 20 — #28 i
i
i
i
i
i
20 Criminal investigation steps on digital investigation
2.3.3 Data recovery/data carving phase
The ”data recovery/data carving” step aims at recovering the removed data
(files). The carving activity consists in recovering files through the files
header and footer8 identification. Indeed, when data carving tool encoun-
ters a coincident sequence of bytes with one of the header stored in its
configuration file, it starts the extraction of bytes from that header until
the first occurrence of bytes coincident with the known footer. If a par-
ticular file should not be equipped with the footer carver, it stops after
a number of bytes arbitrarily predefined by the user in the configuration
file. Obviously, this number must have a reasonable size, preferably over-
sized compared to the size of the file to recover. As a result, the excess
bytes may, in principle, be removed manually. Foremost, it is probably the
best recovery tools on Linux distribution. However, there are also photorec,
scalpel and magicrescue. All these tools are valid and the choice depends
on own requirements. Moreover, the mount of partitions is not necessary in
order to use the above list. In addition, these tools use the file image as an
input.
2.3.4 Disk analysis phase
The ”Disk analysis” step has the goal to analyse the mass memory and to
verify the disk partitioning. This phase is complex, and for this reason, it is
composed of two sub-phases: the partition recognition and the file system
identification.
First of all, partition recognition aims at identifying the partition of the
device. The mass memory could have more than one partition, such as
primary partitions, extended partition and logical partition. In addition,
it could have some unallocated disk space. Moreover, it is often necessary
to rebuild the disk table because the disk has been formatted or could be
corrupted. In this case, testdisk tool is perfect.
Secondly, the aim of file system identification is to identify the file system
of each partition that has been recognized in the preview sub-steps.
As a result of these two phases, all the necessary information are obtained
in order to understand which type of analysis should be conducted. For
example, if there is a primary partition with file system ntfs, certainly there
is a Microsoft Windows (2000, xp, vista, seven, eight) installed system. As
a consequence, the analysis also concerns the system register, the Internet
chronology, emails, chat and so on. On the other hand, if there is a logical
partition, the type of analysis regards exclusively present, hidden or deleted
files. Fdisk, Mmls, Hgparm, Disk stat and HDSentinel represent tools to
8Header and footer are signs that detect the start and the end of the specific type
file; in particular, they concern a group of consecutive octal or hexadecimal values that
are always in a particular position of a determinate file at the start or at the end of this
file.
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analyse the disk with respect to these two phases. After that, it is possible
to develop the first list about all existing files on the mass memory in order
to create a time line. The time line is usually created through the tool
mac-time. Mac-time takes as input a list, which is created by Fls tool and
it is completed of data that are contained into the analysed file system. On
the other hand, Fls takes as input a raw file that derives from the previous
mass memory acquisition or directly on the device, and Fls returns the list
of all files, allocated and not, to be used afterwards as input in mac-time.
2.3.5 Mount partition phase
The mount partition phase is a tricky step. Indeed, it is very important
to avoid that files or everything into the partition could be distorted. In
each court, in each part of the world, it is essential that all procedures
can be done again and the data are not modified or distorted. The mount
command allows connecting a file system to a system folder. In relation
to the steps in Figure 2.3, the mount is not directly within the device, but
it is on the bit stream image. This approach obeys the best practice on
computer forensics. The best practice strongly recommends not to work on
the original mass memory but always on its copy and following this new
presented model after the second phase, the device is never used. The bit
stream image can have various formats and the more common are:
• bit stream image, better known as format dd or raw;
• encase, better known as format ewf;
• advanced forensic format, better known as format aff.
In addition the mount command must ensure:
• read-only option, so there are not problem to possible files change;
• noatime option, so the date of last access to the files does not change;
• noexec option, so running file is not permitted.
2.3.6 Files system analysis
Finally, there is the core of the analysis that needs more time with respect
to the other phases. After recovering data or entering into the file system in
safe way, as described previously, the phase of finding the evidence starts.
This step is characterized by two sub-steps. The first, called system opera-
tion analysis, is conducted only if the analysis regards a primary partition.
In this case, as a result, an operating system, such as Microsoft Windows,
IOS, Linux and so on, is always installed. On the other hand, the sec-
ond phase, called files data analysis, is always developed [Car05]. Indeed,
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there are almost always some personal files into a partition or unallocated
space. Useful command line tools are Find, Locate, Grep (general regular
expression print) and its different version like Egrep, Fgrep or Rgrep. This
tool is extremely important to search in one or more rows of text lines that
correspond to one or more specified patterns with regular expressions or
literal strings. As a result, it produces a list of lines, or also of the single file
names, for which correspondence was found. All they are useful for both sub
phases and probably without them it is impossible to proceed the analysis.
In addition, Find e Locate are also useful. In relation to the first, the tool
searches in the real system. It is slower but always up-to-date and it has
more options such as size, modification time and so on than Locate tool.
On the other hand, Locate uses a previously built database. To update
the database it is necessary to run the command ”updated” on the Unix
shell. The latter is much faster, but it could use an older database and, in
addition, it searches only names or parts of them.
System operation analysis
This phase concerns a wide argument. Indeed, first of all, there are differ-
ent types of operating systems. Secondly, distinct philosophies interpret the
problem ”the management of the computer” in different ways. Therefore,
as done previously, it is going to define the most important operations and
the most useful tools on Linux distribution to resolve the problems.
First of all, if the operating system is Microsoft, the best way to start is
the analyse by WinAudit. This tool takes over every aspect of computer
inventory and configuration. For each application a series of information
is shown. In addition, a useful tool exists called WhatInStartup, which
displays the list of all applications that are launched at the boot of Win-
dows. Moreover, if operating system does not belong to Microsoft family, it
can start with the analysis of Internet history, browser chronology and the
temporary internet files. It is necessary to identify the installed browsers
and their settings in order to find where this information is. A useful pro-
gram is Pasco that reconstructs an individual’s internet activity. Since this
analysis technique is executed regularly, the structure of the data, found in
Internet Explorer activity files (index.dat files), can be researched. Pasco,
whose name derives from the Latin word that means ”browse”, was devel-
oped to examine the contents of Internet Explorer’s cache files. Moreover,
graphical tools to view cache, cookie, history and to find password, saved
on the most important browser, such as IE, Firefox, Chorme, Safari and
Opera, exist. For instance, these software are: Chrome Cache View IE
Cache View, Mozilla Cache View, MUI Cache View,Opera Cache View,
Video Cache View, IE Cookie View, IE History view and IE PassView. Im-
portant programs, such as Messenger, Skype and email management, are
installed within the S.O. As a consequence, in relation to these programs, all
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the personal information is obviously stored within the system. Therefore,
programs to find account info (user and password), such as Mail PassView,
Live Contacts View, PSTPassword, MessenPass, and Protected Pass View,
SkypeLogView, SkypeHistoryViewer, LibPST exist. Finally, the analysis
also concerns the system register. For instance, within Microsoft family, a
tool named RegScanner is present. It is equipped with a powerful search
capability that scans the registry, in order to identify the value, supplied
in input from the user, and it displays all the items identified in a single
window . All these information are relevant in a crime investigation, and
they can be got only analysing the S.O.
Files data analysis
This phase can take really long time, it is extremely ticklish because it
can waste time to analyse and view useless file wit respect to own crime
investigation. Thus, it is very important to have some key words to search
only files that should be relevant to own aims. For example, a method could
be searching all file images, or searching all files that contain a specific word
or words that include your term. For each of these searches, a file list
should be created. In this way, it is possible to verify the relevance of the
file in relation to investigation. In this step, it is useful to know the regular
expression (RE) and to use Grep, Egrep, Fgrep, Find, Locate. Moreover,
after the search, it is necessary to view directly the file, and to annotate the
date of the last modified file and when the file was saved on the device. If
the file is protected by password, it is possible to find it through some tools,
such as Advanced Password Recovery or BulkExtractor. In this phase, the
computer forensic expert is usually not alone, but he needs the help of who
knows if the files are relevant with respect to the investigation.
2.4 Limitations and known issues
The chapter presents a new model in relation to examination phase, which
is defined on SDFIM model, about Non-Volatile memory. In addition, there
are specific references to the tools available in Unix like (Linux) operating
system, in order to support the objectives of the research. Indeed, the
research aims at not buying software, allowing the only use of free tools.
Lastly, it intends to follow the Italian legislation. In fact, if the computer
forensic expert follows the proposed process, he will never go against the
Italian legislation. From this conceptual perspective, the research intends
to mitigate the gap between the normative approach and the pragmatic
questions that characterized the computer forensic field, defining a new
model. However, the model is related only to the Italian legislation because,
unfortunately, in computer forensic scenario each country has its own laws
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despite the Budapest Convention. As a consequence, the model should
be analysed in relation to the laws of the country in which it should be
applied. However, the presented model should be enough flexible to remain
unchanged in relation to normal improvements that Italian legal system
will do in the field of cybercrime and computer forensics. The Linux tools
with respect to each phase are limited to a brief description or mention
only because their complex nature, characterized by various options, is well
explained by many guides or manuals. Nevertheless, the research provides a
complete list of them and hence the way to do the analysis at low cost. The
cybercrime, as explained in the previous paragraphs, is constantly expanded
due to a wide range of applications.
2.5 Improvements and future works
The presented research focuses on Italian legislation, for this reason, one of
the possible developments of this work is precisely the analysis in reference
to other jurisdictions. The necessary work to match the model to other
jurisdictions should not be complicated if the analysed state has rectified
the Budapest Convention.
The proposed model is referred to non-volatile memory into computer foren-
sic scenario. From these perspectives, the research could be implemented
through future works. First of all, one possible future development could
concern the definition of a new model into computer forensic scenario, re-
lated to volatile memory. As a result, it could be possible to analyse simi-
larities and differences between the two models. Secondly, it could be inter-
esting to contribute the Sleuth Kit Hadoop, which incorporates the Sleuth
Kit into a Hadoop cluster, in order to make the analysis faster. In addi-
tion there are other scalable software such as the tool described on [Rou11].
During the test, much time was spent on waiting the process. Finally, in
the future works it could be possible to test the model and some upgrades
in relation to cloud computing. This new challenge that is borderline be-
tween computer forensic and network forensic is extremely important for
future investigations. In addition, cloud computing has numerous benefits,
since it is still a new technology, there are vulnerabilities that need to be
addressed [Man12]. Cloud consumers and providers are investigating on
cloud, providing secure communication and services [Man12].
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Chapter 3
Live digital forensic
This chapter presents a case study of Live Digital Forensics (LDF) on the
two most popular operating systems: Windows XP and Windows Seven
[GS13]. More in detail it describes the research activity branch regarding
the live digital forensic on Windows systems. The case study focuses on
some common applications running on these systems. Additionally, as many
types of applications rely on commercial software, one of the main goals of
this work is to restrict to the use of free software, in order to prove that the
same results can be achieved while minimizing costs. The rest of this chapter
is organized as follows. Section 3.1 discusses what live digital forensic is, in
order to provide a clear and comprehensive definition of this concept. The
second part (Section 3.2) describes the main differences between Windows
XP and Windows 7 while the third part (Section 3.3) will present some
tests. Section 3.4 will discuss the tests limitations and, finally, Section 3.5
will go through improvements and future works.
3.1 Overview
Over the last few years, analysing a computer or a digital device has become
a necessity in the field of criminal investigations [OS11a]. Traditional digi-
tal forensics analysis includes static analysis, which concerns data that are
permanently stored in devices, and live analysis, which regards data that
are temporarily stored in equipment or that transit in networks. Whichever
organization, businesses or governments, are actually making efforts to con-
trast cybercrime.
Moreover, although digital forensics has recently faced new challenges [Cal09],
it still remains the main way to investigate digital evidences and to answer
questions in relation to previous digital states and events [Car09]. Indeed,
the Internet is one of the main means to attack an organisation. Nowadays,
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governments and organisations are increasingly reinforcing their reliance on
cyber technologies, such as cloud computing, on-line banking and social net-
works. In tandem, the rate of innovation in new technologies is expanded
and organisations are struggling to keep up with the risks of introducing and
using new technologies. Cyber activities have provided both a new type of
economic crimes and new vectors to facilitate existing ones [CH12].
Nowadays, cybercrime has interested governments, business and private cit-
izens for different issues. First of all, governments has faced this issue be-
cause it represents a social problem (child trafficking, child pornography,
etc.) and, at the same time, a security challenge (espionage, terrorism,
etc.). Subsequently, in this specific field, business risk concerns business
espionage and therefore financial problems. Finally, citizens risk theft iden-
tity, frauds and so on. In addition, Symantec (2010) argues that during
the 2008-2010 reference periods, the threat landscape, once dominated by
worms and viruses created by irresponsible hackers, is now ruled by a new
type of criminal. The cybercrime is typically a scam that is perpetrated by
bogus emails, sent by ”phishers”, which are designed to steal confidential
information. Moreover, in the black market, different tools are used for at-
tacks, such as the so-called crime ware programs: bots, Trojan horses, and
spyware [Mer10].
In this scenario, computer security and digital forensics analysis are both
correct solutions in order to prevent and to search evidences in relation to:
data theft, industrial espionage, unauthorized access to computer systems
company, damage to information and to answer any potential litigation.
All governments and businesses are increasingly being targeted by waves of
attacks from criminals and countries, looking for an economic or military
benefit. So numerous and advanced are the attacks that many organizations
are tackling problematic issues, such as the identification of the greatest risk
in terms of threats and vulnerabilities and the allocation of resources in or-
der to stop the most probable and damaging attacks in advanced.
In addition, although digital forensics is increasingly becoming important
for society and in the scientific debate, the regulations that govern this type
of crime are constantly evolving, representing a new field in the legislative
scenarios. Moreover, not only does the legislature often fail in dealing with
this kind of crimes, but these violations also involve several countries with
different legal systems. In this reference context, it is necessary to consider
the offences that every citizen commits. They go from tax evasion to on-line
banking fraud, terrorist operations, phishing or child pornography , juvenile
pornography.
From this conceptual framework, the research work describes a case study
of LDF on the two most popular operating systems: Windows XP and
Windows 7. For the last several months, Microsoft has emphasized the im-
portance of migrating from Windows XP to Windows 7, but even now more
than 30 percent of computers are equipped with this OS (Figure 3.1 [neta]).
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Figure 3.1: Desktop Top Operating System Share Trend (June, 2012 to April,
2013) [neta].
LDF is the branch that focuses on the analysis of volatile memory
[SETB08]. Volatile memory is the work memory and it requires power to
maintain the stored information, in other words it needs power to reach the
computer memory. Hence the analysis of this memory is extremely sensi-
tive to whatever happens [OS11b]. The idea is to make a dump of a volatile
memory for off-line analysis [HBN09].
An investigator can then build the case through the analysis of the mem-
ory dump in an isolated environment that does not alter original evidences.
This approach addresses some of the issues to live digital forensics anal-
ysis [N.11]. First of all, this approach limits impact on the compromised
system. Secondly, the analysis is repeatable and it is possible to ask new
questions later. In addition, off-line volatile memory analysis does not al-
low to compromise machine on operating system. This enables detection of
hidden processes through installation of rootkit or a similar tool [Wea08].
Few years ago, copying memory from an external storage device without
modifying the memory’s contents was possible thanks to a special pre-
installed hardware [CG04]. Today, different tools for memory analysis are
proposed such as FATKit [JWFA06], Volatools [WJ07], FACE [CCM∗08]
and bodySnatcher [Sch07].
3.2 Overview of main differences between Win-
dows XP and Windows 7
Windows XP has represented a crucial point in the successful period of
economic and technological expansion of Windows. After Windows XP,
different operating systems have alternated in the international scenario
Fabrizio Solinas Tecnical and legal perspectives on forensics scenario
i
i
“Tesi” — 2014/5/5 — 10:52 — page 28 — #36 i
i
i
i
i
i
28 Live digital forensic
Figure 3.2: Average quarterly infection rate (CCM) by operating system and
service pack in 2010 [DC10].
such as Windows Vista and, most recently, Windows 7 and Windows 8.
Each operating system is unique in its own way [Car07]. Windows XP was
released the 31 of December of 2001. In May 2012, XP still had a 44.26%
share of the entire operating system market [urlc] whereas in April 2013
XP had 38.31 % and 7 44.72% [urlb]. Many users think that Windows
XP is still sufficient for their needs and they do not understand the value
of upgrading to a more recent system. However, Windows 7 is four to
five times less vulnerable to malware infections than Windows XP [DC10].
Overall, as the figure 3.2 shows, the study has emphasized how the more
recent Microsoft operating systems, which have the latest service packs,
have a lower infection rates in relation to the older ones. Indeed, Windows
7 and Windows Server 2008 R2 have the highest marks for security [DC10].
On the other hand, XP still has an important slice of trade and for this
reason Microsoft is going to continue supporting it until April 2014, though
XP can no longer be purchased.
In relation to XP, Microsoft has introduced many new features and im-
provements. Some of these are improvements in security and overall per-
formance, other ameliorations are connected with better compatibility with
other programs. However, despite these improvements, different reasons
should make upgrading to Window 7 tempting. First of all, Microsoft Win-
dows 7 aims at accommodating the new emerging trends, such as the con-
stant development of hardware (monitor touch, spread of 64-bit processors,
solid state drives, multicore processors, etc..), the increasing popularity of
mobile computing devices (Netbook, Tablet, Smart Phone), the use of home
networks and the deployment of Media Center. Logically, all these function-
alities need higher minimum requirements. Indeed, for supporting Windows
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7 a machine should be equipped at least with
• a 1Ghz 32 bit processor;
• 1 GB of RAM (32-bit version) or 2GB of RAM (64-bit version);
• 16 GB of Hard Drive (32-bit version) or 20 GB (64-bit version).
The main new features of the operating system are:
• New Taskbar: in Windows 7 taskbar running programs are grouped
under a single icon that is smaller than in Windows XP. In this way,
Windows 7 saves space. Moving the mouse over the icon, the operating
system provides a preview of the content and the possibility to access
more quickly to the desired window;
• Home and Remote Media Streaming: it allows to use personal com-
puter as a multimedia container file (images. music, video) in order
to access files from external computers in a quickly way or to send
playback to compatible devices (eg TV);
• Windows Touch: it allows the user to interact with the operating
system directly using her own hands, through a touch system;
• Windows XP mode: it allows to run the applications that have been
developed for Windows XP in a special virtualized environment;
• Windows Firewall and Windows Defender: the operating system is
integrated with the new versions of Microsoft programs for the pro-
tection of PCs against intruders and malware or spyware;
• BitLocker: the operating system natively provides a tool to encrypt
and decrypt the entire content of the hard disk;
• Jump Lists: right click on one of the icons in the taskbar opens a
menu that contains the typical operations performed by the program
and the list of recently opened documents. Jump Lists are created
automatically by the operating system, but it is possible to create
a software customizations for the user and for the developer . The
presence of recently opened documents in the new Jump Lists makes
this tool very interesting from the point of view of the forensic analysis.
• Troubleshooting Center: a new tool is accessible from the Control
Panel that gives you a report of problems on your computer (e.g.
connectivity failures, configuration of hardware devices and drivers,
problems with application software) and it suggests possible solutions;
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• New User Access Control: the User Access Control is a feature of
Windows 7 that stops the execution of applications that are considered
dangerous. In Windows Vista, this feature could only be turned on
or off, while in Windows 7, one can set four levels of granularity;
• New Parental Control: The Parental Control is the feature that allows
parents to protect and restrict the use of computers to children. In
particular, you can limit the time access, you can block a certain game
and you can prevent access to certain applications.
Overall, Windows 7 is faster than Windows XP. Networking computers
together is easier and more streamlined than in XP or Vista. Moreover, in
Windows 7 the upload and download speeds for data are improved. This
includes increased speeds for browsing the internet and downloading files.
XP has never been known for having good security. Indeed, User Account
Control (UAC) has been introduced with Vista and later it has been kept in
Windows 7 but with additional controls and improved functionalities. UAC
is simply a security feature that helps to block viruses and malware. Al-
though, it is not infallible, it certainly limits the damages that certain types
of malware can do to a PC. In addition, even if XP performs well, playing
computer games in Windows 7 takes gaming to a new level. Microsoft’s
DirectX 10 technology offers better graphics and sound. Additionally, it
provides better performance even with a mid-range PC.
However, in order to ease the transition to Windows 7, Microsoft has in-
cluded what it is well-known as ”XP Mode”. This feature is available with
the Professional, Enterprise, and Ultimate versions of Windows 7. XP Mode
is a way of installing and running programs that are not compatible with 7.
It is a great yet cost effective tool that can allow one to go back and forth be-
tween XP and 7. In addition, Microsoft is also suggesting that organizations
can save money by moving from Windows XP to Windows 7 [AG12]. Mi-
crosoft clearly wants to wrest the venerable 10-year-old Windows XP from
the grip of organizations that have depended on it. Windows XP has been
embraced by the commercial world in a surprising way. IDC’s report, ”Mit-
igating Risk: Why Sticking With Windows XP Is a Bad Idea,” [AG12] is
a financial analysis based on interviews with nine ”large” organizations (an
average of 3,680 employees). This study quantified the costs associated with
staying on Windows XP, including lost user productivity time, as well as IT
support and help desk costs. On the other hand, the study does not analyse
an important and fundamental factor that is represented by the costs asso-
ciated with updating applications to run on Windows 7. Of course, security
should be a principal concern for those organizations that still use Windows
XP. Indeed, the OS is going to lose security-patch support by April 8, 2014
in accordance with Microsoft’s product life cycle schedule. Windows XP is
moving out of its ”extended support” phase, which means ”the end of se-
curity updates, (paid) hot fix agreement support, and per-incident support
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services,” according to IDC’s report [AG12]. An alternative option for orga-
nizations might be to pay Microsoft for ”customized support,” but this can
be an expensive option. According to an IDC study, that the annual cost
for organizations to maintain a Windows XP-based PC is $870. The same
cost for a Windows 7-based PC is $168. As a consequence, organizations
potentially can save about $701 per PC per year by moving to Microsoft’s
newer OS, according to the report. The report breaks down Windows XP
user productivity costs into six categories, including time lost to malware,
time taken to reimage a PC, reboot waits, downtime and time waiting for
help desk support. Reboots and malware constitute the top two productiv-
ity time drainers among users. Finally, according to the report: ”Moving
to Windows 7 will reduce the time invested in patch management by 82%,”
[AG12].
3.3 The case studies on Microsoft Windows
system
The research analysis has been conducted in different virtual machines. In
these types of test, the use of virtual machines is fundamental. Indeed, in
order to repeat test, and therefore to insert data into table, it is necessary
that test could be replicable and results of each test do not vary in relation
to unpredictable causes. From this perspective, the test, mentioned below,
has been repeated for seven times in order to obtain the certainty of data.
Moreover, in order to make the study more detailed, it has been conducted
tests on systems, different from virtual machine, that have validated the ob-
tained results. However, these tests have not been taken into consideration
due to the impossibility to repeat them and, as a consequence, the invalidity
of the scientific data. First of all, it is necessary to explain the configuration
of the host systems and secondly the configuration of the virtual machines.
The host system configuration is a MacBook Pro 15-inch, late 2008 with
OS X Lion 10.7.5 equipped with:
• Processor: 2.93 GHz Intel Core 2 Duo;
• Memory (RAM): 8GB of RAM;
• Graphics: NVIDIA GeForce 9400M 256MB.
The virtualization system is VMware Fusion Professional 5.0.3. Two
different virtual machines are used to run tests. The first is equipped as
follows: Windows XP Professional service pack 2 with 512 MB and 15
GB of HD, while the second is equipped with Windows 7 Professional 32
bit with 1 GB of RAM and 15 GB of HD. In both systems, the following
software is installed: Skype 6.0.0.126, Google Talk 3.7.1.9330, Internet Ex-
plorer 8.0.7600.16385 (IE). Moreover, the following accounts are created
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Figure 3.3: Dump RAM: Skype focus.
to make the use of this software possible: two Facebook accounts (Al-
ice Prova, Bob Prova), two Hotmail accounts (alice prova@hotmail.com,
bob prova@hotmail.com), two Gmail accounts (alice.prova.0gmail.com, bob.prova.0gmail.com),
one Yahoo account (alice prova@yahoo.it). Google Talk needs the use of the
Gmail account, while Skype requires the use of Hotmail account. Indeed,
Windows Live Messenger accounts are switched into Skype account in April
2013. The tests are divided into steps, which are:
• Starting up the virtual machine;
• Use of the analysed service;
• Acquisition of the dump;
• Dump analysis.
The software FTK Imager [Sof12] is used to do the acquisition. FTK Imager
is present, by default, on the live CD of DEFT. The Dump is saved in an
external drive, connected by the USB.
3.3.1 Skype’s RAM analysis
After the starting up, in each virtual machine Skype runs. As a consequence,
it is logged with alice prova and it is added Bob’s account (bob prova).
After that bob prova is showed in contact list, first of all a chat starts
and then a skype call, secondly Alice signs out from the Skype. Nothing
about the history of Skype account will be saved because it is setted. The
fourth step is showed in the figure 3.3, where through the dump analysis
it is possible to find information about the chat, the source’s account and
destination’s account. Therefore, by the RAM’s dump it is possible to find
all the communications of Skype activities.
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Figure 3.4: Dump RAM: Google Talk focus.
Figure 3.5: Dump RAM: Google Talk focus.
3.3.2 Google Talk’s RAM analysis
After the preliminary operation of starting up (run VM and run Google
Talk), from the account alice prova.0@gmail.com it is added bob prova.0@gmail.com.
After the presence of bob prova.0@gmail.com on the list of contacts, a chat
starts and after this a call of few seconds. From the analysis, it is possible to
find evidences in relation to both actions. First of all, it has been recovered
the entire chat conversation and information about the start date and end
date of the conversation. However, the two considered operating systems
do not show significant differences. In the pictures 3.4 and 3.5 some frames
of chat and the date of the start and of the end of a brief conversation are
highlighted.
3.3.3 Internet Explorer’s RAM analysis
IE is tested on Facebook, Gmail, hotmail and Yahoo. The choice of this
browser is related to the fact that it is the more used browser in the web
(Figure 3.6). For each of the virtual machines, Windows XP and Windows
7, the browser applications have been verified using the portals Facebook,
Yahoo, Hotmail and Gmail, which are some of the most used in the world.
The tests are made using Internet Explorer in two ways: normal mode and
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Figure 3.6: Desktop top browser share trend [urla].
private mode. The second does not record your browsing history, and, at
least in theory, it should not leave traces on your computer, in the form of
cookies, when you close the window or Tab1.
The scenario for each sub-section is the same. For each VM, first of
all, after the system is ready, Internet Explorer runs. By default, IE opens
www.google.it web page, the correct url is typed and logged to web portal
with alice prova account. In the case of tests in private mode, after IE runs
it is necessary to start the private mode and to type the correct url. Dump
of RAM is done for each single test. When the browser is opened, it is
necessary to logout first and then to do the dump.
Facebook
The Facebook tests focus on the chat activities. After alice prova is logged,
bob prova account is added to the list of friends and after the friend ac-
ceptance, a chat starts. The chat lasts for 5 minutes. The tests are split
in chat with browser in normal mode a private mode and, as a result, the
RAM dump is done in the two cases: closed and opened browser. However,
in those cases the logout is always done. As it can be seen on Table 3.1
and Table 3.2, there is only one different result between XP and 7. This
concerns the case in which the browser works in normal mode and when the
browser is opened during the dump. Logically, the logout from Facebook is
guaranteed. In this specific case on the Windows XP, it is possible to find
the no encrypted account’s password; whereas on Windows 7 the password
is not present in the dump. The research keywords used on the dump are:
Facebook, prova, alice, bob.
1In the area of graphical user interfaces (GUI), a tabbed document interface (TDI) or
a Tab is one that allows multiple documents to be contained within a single window, using
tabs as a navigational widget for switching between sets of documents. It is an interface
style most commonly associated with web browsers, web applications, text editors, and
preference panes.
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Yahoo,Hotmail and gmail
The Yahoo and Hotmail tests focus on the mail activities. The results are
identical, therefore they are analysed in the same section. The scenario of
tests is login on the web mail with the browser in normal or private mode
at the url https://login.yahoo.com for Yahoo and https://login.live.com/
for Hotmail. After that an email is composed, it is sent from the al-
ice prova@yahoo.it or alice prova@hotmail.it to bob prova@hotmail.it. Fi-
nally, logout from the web mail and the RAM dump can start. The same
operation is repeated changing surfing mode (normal or private) or operat-
ing system. However in these cases, there are not differences in relation to
the variables: OS, browser in private or normal mode and browser open or
close during dump. The research keywords used on the dump are: %40hot-
mail.it, hotmail.it, prova, alice, bob, %40gmail.it, gmail.it, %40yahoo.it.
3.3.4 Summarized of Internet Explorer tests
The table 3.1 summarizes the Internet Explorer tests on Windows XP,
whereas the table 3.2 sums up the tests on Window 7.
As the tables show, there is not significant difference; however some
details are evident. First of all, in the first row of both tables, it is possible
to recognize a dissonance in relation to Yahoo and Hotmail. Indeed, in
XP it is possible discover sender and recipient that are not feasible in 7.
Looking the second row, when the browser is opened, there is only one but
extremely important difference: the account’s password is decrypted, as well
as the chat. In the third row, the email recipient is identifiable on XP and
in relation to Yahoo and Hotmail, meanwhile in the other cases it is not
possible. Finally in the last row, still in Yahoo and Hotmail web site, there
is a difference. This is the only case in which Windows 7 provides more
information than XP. Indeed, the sender’s user-name can be discovered.
3.4 Limitations and known issues
This chapter has highlighted the differences, in live digital forensics, be-
tween Windows XP and Windows 7 in a few, but extremely permeated,
software. The research shows that there are no important differences be-
tween Windows XP and Windows 7 during live forensic analysis. The only
one is due to the use of Facebook. Indeed using Facebook by IE in normal
mode and leaving the browser opened, though logout is done, in Windows
XP it is possible to find the not encrypted password, whereas in Windows 7
the password cannot be found. Probably Microsoft does not implement any
function to remove evidences from the RAM, and this task could be imple-
mented by each installed software. Certainly, this is good in relation to the
investigation of police, but the private and public organizations probably
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Table 3.1: Summarized of Internet Explorer tests on Windows XP
Type of
surfing
Dump
with
browser
closed/
opened
Facebook
(Chat)
Yahoo
(Mail)
Hotmail
(Mail)
Gmail
(Mail)
Normal
mode
Closed User-
name
(sender
and re-
cipient)
and
chat’s
body
User-
name
(sender
and re-
cipient)
, sub-
ject and
email’s
body
User-
name
(sender
and re-
cipient),
subject
and
email’s
body
User-
name of
sender,
sender,
recipient,
subject
and
email’s
body
Normal
mode
Opened User-
name
(sender
and re-
cipient),
account’s
password
not en-
crypted
and chat
User-
name
(sender
and re-
cipient),
subject
and
email’s
body
User-
name
(sender
and re-
cipient),
subject
and
email’s
body
User-
name of
sender,
sender,
recipient,
subject
and
email’s
body
In Pri-
vate
Browsing
Closed Nothing User-
name
(sender
and re-
cipient),
Sub-
ject and
email’s
body
User-
name
(sender
and re-
cipient),
Sub-
ject and
email’s
body
User-
name of
sender,
sender,
recipient,
subject
and
email’s
body
In Pri-
vate
Browsing
Opened User-
name
(sender
and re-
cipient)
and
chat’s
body
Subject
and
email’s
body
Subject
and
email’s
body
User-
name of
sender,
sender,
recipient,
subject
and
email’s
body
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Table 3.2: Summarized of Internet Explorer test on Windows 7
Type of
surfing
Dump
with
browser
closed/
opened
Facebook
(Chat)
Yahoo
(Mail)
Hotmail
(Mail)
Gmail
(Mail)
Normal
mode
Closed User-
name
(sender
and re-
cipient)
and
chat’s
body
Subject
and
email’s
body
Subject
and
email’s
body
User-
name of
sender,
sender,
recipient,
subject
and
email’s
body
Normal
mode
Opened User-
name
(sender
and re-
cipient)
and
chat’s
body
User-
name of
sender,
sender,
recipient,
subject
and
email’s
body
User-
name of
sender,
sender,
recipient,
subject
and
email’s
body
User-
name of
sender,
sender,
recipient,
subject
and
email’s
body
In Pri-
vate
Browsing
Closed Nothing User-
name
(sender),
Sub-
ject and
email’s
body
User-
name
(sender),
Sub-
ject and
email’s
body
User-
name of
sender,
sender,
recipient,
subject
and
email’s
body
In Pri-
vate
Browsing
Opened User-
name
(sender
and re-
cipient)
and
chat’s
body
User-
name
(sender),
Sub-
ject and
email’s
body
User-
name
(sender),
Sub-
ject and
email’s
body
User-
name of
sender,
sender,
recipient,
subject
and
email’s
body
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would not appreciate any unauthorized access on their machines. However,
the dump analyses are simplified because the content of research was known
a priori. In general, the work of a computer forensics investigator can be
very stressful because although different information is available, only some
of them are useful for investigation. From this research, it is possible to
notice that Facebook use email=user-name&pass=password, therefore they
can be used in general as keywords, whereas [”msg”:”text” is always present
for the message parts. In Skype there is always part identity=, name or du-
ration, the first and the second are always followed by information about
account of sender or recipient, while the third is followed by the seconds of
call if the evidence is a call and not a chat. Using Google Talk incoming
and outcoming mean respectively an input to the sender and a message sent
by the sender.
3.5 Improvements and future works
In this work, the analysis on the two common operating systems of Mi-
crosoft, Windows XP and Windows 7, has been presented. In the future, it
is scheduled to complete the analysis with Widows 8, which represents the
new Microsoft operating system. This is not the only possible implementa-
tion. Indeed, forensics analysis is extremely interested in knowing dissimi-
larities among different browsers. Moreover, it is important to notice that
smart users are more likely to prefer third party browsers (e.g. Chrome,
Firefox) over IE. Browsers are among the most used software for private
issues (e.g. internet banking, social networking, shared documents). From
this viewpoint, the work will evolve through Windows 8 and other browsers
in order to complete the scenario on Windows. Moreover, the study could
be completed through the correlations with other operating systems such as
Mac OS X and the most common Linux distributions (Ubuntu, Red Hat).
Finally, it could be interesting to compare Mac OS X and Linux distribu-
tion, as they both are unix-like, to prove that these operating systems have
the same behaviour.
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Chapter 4
Conclusions
The conclusion chapter aims at providing the final considerations and rec-
ommendations coming from the research work. The final chapter is com-
posed of five paragraphs. The first 4.1 summarizes the main concepts of the
thesis in order to clarify and to hammer home the key issues that the re-
search analyses. The second paragraph 4.2 examines the implications of the
results of the research in relation to the research questions, defined in the .
The third section 4.3 concerns the inferences related to theories on digital
forensics applied to common application on Microsoft Windows operating
system. Moreover, areas of further research in relation to the results of the
thesis are suggested. The fourth 4.4 regards the concluding remarks of the
research. Finally, the last paragraph 4.5 summarizes the work published.
4.1 Summary of the key concepts
The research work focuses mainly on the analysis of stand-alone systems and
on how different procedures, methodologies and techniques can be applied.
Indeed, although digital forensic science has been analysed only from the
computer science viewpoint, it represents an extremely wide topic, dealing
with various questions, such as analysis of protocol in the network, stand-
alone systems, interconnected systems oriented to the research of evidence.
From this conceptual point of view, digital forensic science is strongly con-
nected with cybercrime.
Nowadays, not only has cybercrime increasingly become a significant prob-
lem for every business that need to be faced with extremely attention, but
it is also a serious difficulty for governments and citizens. Moreover, cy-
bercrime can damage both small, medium and big businesses. From the
business’ perspective, cybercrime entails economic problems that can as-
sume different forms, such as industrial secrets. On the other hand, from
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the governments’ viewpoint, cybercrime involves social problems and inter-
nal security questions. Whereas, from the citizens’ point of view, cybercrime
can become whether a personal problem or an economic matter.
More in general, first of all cybercrime, interpreted and analysed as what-
ever security problem, could be dealt with prevention and, in this case, we
talk about informatics security. Secondly, it could be faced with post-crime
investigations, concerning digital forensics. The former regards the adage
”prevention is better than a cure”. The latter starts after the crime hap-
pened.
Despite the fact that it is not very common to have information on wars
among whether governments or businesses into cyberspace, they happen
frequently and they are kept secret from specific interlocutors. Indeed,
compared to traditional wars, those into the cyberspace are invisible and
the society has the overall impression that everything is under control and
everyday life is wholly peaceful. On the other hand, the implications of
a lost battle into the cyberspace could have catastrophic consequences for
both government and business that lose it. For example, if Samsung came
into possession of sensitive data of Apple in relation to new tablet, it would
cause a serious damage to Apple.
From the viewpoint of the methodological procedure analysis, after having
studied and examined in depth the subject from both computer science and
legal perspectives, it has been clear that its contextualization within spe-
cific jurisdiction has not been present in the literature. As a consequence,
in the chapter it is defined a new methodology, applied to the Italian juris-
diction and based on the Budapest Convention that was signed before the
amendment, defined by the Law 18th March 2008, no. 48 by Italy. Indeed,
all models, related to the analysis of non-volatile memory, are general and
non-specific to a particular reference context. From this conceptual point
of view, defining a homogeneous procedure, based on the Italian legislation,
seems to be indispensable and necessary. Moreover, in order to have ev-
idence that could be used in court to prove the crime, this evidence has
to be traced in relation to a series of procedures that make the evidence
unexceptionable.
On the other hand, in the second chapter 3, the operation, performed by
more common software in Windows environment, is studied in order to un-
derstand how the evolution of Microsoft operating systems interacts with
particularly relevant problems concerning privacy. Indeed, through the anal-
ysis of the RAM, it is possible to trace different sensitive data of the single
user. However, this activity could be accomplished in relation to whether
worthy reason, such as the research of evidence by the side of law, or illegal
aims, such as the identity thief or the theft of other sensitive data.
In conclusion, the research is linked to the idea that nowadays it is impos-
sible to carry on without digital forensics due to the cybercrime and the
significant problems that it involves. In addition, in order to perform the
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task in the better way, forensic computer scientist has to know the laws in
their specific reference context. Indeed, ignoring the legal procedures and
laws could entail to make all the work useless to be presented in the court.
4.2 Set of conclusions with respect to the re-
search questions
In the introduction , different research questions are identified. This para-
graph aims at analysing the implications that the results of the dissertation
have for the research questions, providing a set of conclusions with respect
to each of them. In particular, they are:
1. How is it possible to apply the theoretical concepts of the digital foren-
sics processes into Italian ”legislation”? Does the Italian legislation
deal with this problem concerning processes and procedure that make
evidence usable in the court?
2. Among more common software and operating systems, does a form
of control exist to remedy for a possible forensic analysis of RAM? Is
it possible to trace personal information analysing RAM concerning a
computer that remains in operation?
In relation to the first research question, both thesis and the literature
underline how the minimum distraction could make all works useless. In-
deed,conducting a forensic analysis that goes beyond an educational lessons
means to take into consideration the law that regulates that specific field
of analysis. However, sometimes, the law does not keep up with new tech-
niques or methodologies. For example, some procedures are not regulated
within the system of laws. As a result, therefore some normative ”holes”
exist. In these cases, it is appropriate to take inspiration from the best
practice, which usually defines, in an empirical way, the methodologies to
follow in relation to specific situations. On the other hand, in some cases,
although the procedure is regulated by a specific law, it is never analysed
and focused by the scholars and researchers. These particular cases are de-
scribed in the section 2, where best practices concerning forensic analysis of
non-volatile memory are related to the Italian legislation. In this case, as
described by the figure 2.4, the process has been divided into more phases.
Some of them are preparatory to other stages; others could be conducted in
parallel. Moreover, the model does not contrast the Italian law no. 48/2008
that ratifies the Budapest Convention, which was signed by Italy on 23th
November 2001. Considering these two dates, it is to understand how the
law is ”late” in relation to significant problems, such as cybercrime that
has become extremely actual in the last decade. From this perspective, the
struggle against cybercrime represents one of the principal reasons that have
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inspired this research. Indeed, in Italy, sometimes forensics experts present
to the court evidence that, from the legal viewpoint, are not valid because
they do not apply the specific reference law.
In relation to the second research question, after the application of the
two most common operating systems in the Microsoft environment, the
RAM has been analysed, Figure 3.1. The use of the two operating sys-
tems has been delimited to some software due to simplicity reasons. On the
other hand, this software are extremely thorny due to the type of informa-
tion that transmits through them. Indeed, the above-mentioned software
is Skype, GTalk and Internet Explorer in relation to some websites that
concern extremely sensitive data (Facebbok, Gmail, Hotmail and Yahoo).
As highlighted in the paragraphs 3.4 and 3.5, the differences between these
two operating systems are minimal and unimportant. However, analysing
the RAM, it is important to underline the possibility to retrieve username,
chat’s body and, in one occasion, the not-encrypted password(3.1 row teo,
colums three).
4.3 Implications for theories and further re-
search areas
The analysis on chapter 2 and on 3 underlines different aspects with some
important implications for theories related to this specific area of interest.
The first chapter underlines the lack of contextualisation concerning tech-
niques and procedures, defined as best practices, in relation to the law that
should regulate them. From this conceptual perspective, it could be useful
to verify if the model, define in relation to the Italian legislation, could be
applied to other jurisdictions. Moreover, it could be interesting to compare
one jurisdiction, whose country has ratified the Budapest Convention and
another one that it does not, in terms of method applicability. In this way, it
could be possible to understand if the convention defines, albeit in general,
some guidelines that could entail specific laws that could be homogeneous
in relation to different countries. In prospect, it is expected that the model
entails only secondary and negligible changes, particularly in those countries
that have ratified the Budapest Convention. Moreover, from the practical
and technical viewpoint, tests need considerable time. Indeed, one of the
constraints, imposed by the research has been to use only common personal
computer and open source software. Therefore, ad hoc tools, which could
drastically reduce times, has not been used. Indeed, among this software,
there are some alpha or beta versions that can operate in parallel, taking
advantages of modern CPU. However, at the moment, this software can be
used only for performance tests or quality tests. In this field, there are dif-
ferent possibilities to further researches and theories in relation to parallel
codes and algorithms. Indeed, verifying whether which algorithms or which
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parts of algorithms could be paralleled is an extremely interesting and stim-
ulating research field that the thesis could develop.
The second chapter highlights how Microsoft operating systems and single
software do not deal with possible evidence that remain in the RAM after
the program implementation. In relation to this specific problem, having
limited tests to only two operating systems Microsoft XP and Windows 7
and to some software, the research is only in an embryonic form. Indeed, it
would be necessary to test more software in order to confirm if the specific
software does not deal with this question. Moreover, although Windows
XP and Windows 7 operating systems are more used, they are not repre-
sentative only of Microsoft products. Indeed, Microsoft has a new operating
system, called Windows 8, that is rising in ranking in the use of modern
personal computer Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Windows desktop top operating system share trend [netb]
Windows 7 Windows XP Windows 8 Windows 8.1
Sept, 2013 46.39% 31.42% 8.02% 0.87%
Oct, 2013 46.42% 31.24% 7.53% 1.72%
Nov, 2013 46.64% 31.22% 6.66% 2.64%
Dec, 2013 47.52% 28.98% 6.89% 3.60%
Therefore, from this viewpoint, the research should be implemented in
relation to other operating systems, such as whether Mac OS X or Linux.
In the latter, it could be possible to study and develop a tool to implement
the cleanliness of RAM in case of lack of some forms of control. Moreover, it
could be possible to evaluate differences, in terms of performance, between
systems that have the new service and systems without the new service.
4.4 Concluding remarks
The research work has focused on two principal topics. First of all, a
methodology concerning forensic analysis of non-volatile memory in rela-
tion to the Italian legislation has been defined. Secondly, the thesis has
regarded the analysis of volatile memory in relation to personal computers,
identifying possible situations to advantage researchers who intend to con-
duct this type of analysis. The first part has underlined the importance of
the ratification of Budapest Convention by the side of Italy. As a conse-
quence, who conducts forensic analysis in relation to different sectors has
to deal with the reference legislation. Indeed, in the context of computer
science, experts sometimes ignore the reference normative and, in this way,
they make their work useless. For this reason, a methodological procedure
has been defined in relation to the analysis of non-volatile memory in order
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to make evidence unexceptionable before the law. The phases are syntheti-
cally defined in the Figure 2.3, in which it is possible to identify some steps
that are preparatory and others that can operate in parallel because they
are completely.
The second part of the research that can be consulted in the chapter 3
shows how the detailed analysis of RAM in personal computer, which is left
on, makes extremely sensitive information available. However, the analysed
systems are not completely thorough due to time questions. Indeed, in order
to have a complete framework, it could be necessary to have more time. On
the other hand, the most used and the most pervasive systems in relation
to the average user have been analysed and studied. The average user is
usually a user who is exposed to specific risks. Moreover, the research work
has highlighted how both Microsoft and whichever software do not apply
any procedure of RAM cleaning, entailing the possibility to trace sensitive
data that could be useful in relation to a specific aim.
In conclusion, the research work intends to provide a contribution to both
the definition of a new procedure that can be used by forensic experts in the
analysis of non-volatile memory within the Italian jurisdiction, and how op-
erating systems maintain confidential information without worrying about
consequences.
4.5 Final Remarks
We published the exposed procedure and methodology on Chapter 2 at
the Second International Conference on Cyber Security, Cyber Peacefare
and Digital Forensic (Cybersec2013) at Kuala Lampur, Malaysia - March
4-6, 2013 [FS13b] and in an article titled ”Computer Forensics between the
Italian Legislation and Pragmatic Questions” published by the International
Journal of Cyber-Security and Digital Forensics (IJCSDF) [FS13a]. The
chapter 3 published on The Second International Conference on Informatics
& Applications (ICIA2013) at Lodz, Polish - Sept. 23-25, 2013 [GS13].
Finally, during the PhD, a minor publication presented at CHITALY 2011
at Alghero, Italy - Sept. 13-16 2011 [FS11].
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